Security of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based on noisy coherent states and channel is analyzed. Assuming the noise of coherent states is induced by Fred, a neutral party relative to others, we prove that the prepare and measurement scheme and entanglement-based scheme are equivalent. Then, we show that this protocol is secure against Gaussian collective attacks even if the channel is lossy and noisy, and further, a lower bound to the secure key rate is derived.
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The principles of quantum mechanics make it possible to distribute physically secure keys between two distant parties [1, 2] . In particular, continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) has made remarkable achievements during the past few years. Several CV-QKD schemes based on coherent states combined with homodyne or heterodyne detection have been proposed [3, 4] and experimentally demonstrated [5] - [8] , and the unconditional security of CV-QKD with ideal optical source has also been systematically studied [9, 10, 11, 12] . However, there still have difficulties to calculate the secure key rate of the CV-QKD protocols with noisy coherent states, because of the absence of a good model to characterize the source imperfections. For instance, it is not a good idea to ascribe the source imperfection to the channel excess noise directly, which implies that Eve is able to control such noise. In this case, Eve actually knows that Alice is using a P&M scheme instead of an E-B one, and the two schemes are no longer equivalent. Further more, from a practical viewpoint, it is suspicious to assume that Eve is able to control the noise inside Alice's side. The same topic was discussed recently [13] , in which the noise of source and modulation is controlled neither by legitimate users nor eavesdroppers. However, under this assumption, Eve can not purify the states of Alice and Bob, which implies that the previous proof on the optimality of Gaussian attacks [14] is not available. As a result, the key rate derived in [13] may be insecure under collective attack.
To solve these problems, in this paper, we propose a new way to characterize the source and modulation noise and derive a security bound of the CV-QKD protocol through a lossy and noisy channel. As we know, in a standard prepare and measurement (P&M) scheme, Alice generates two Gaussian random numbers, Q A and P A , with mean values 0 and variances V A , to prepare |Q A + iP A by modulating an initial coherent state. Then, she sends this state to Bob through a quantum channel characterized by transmittance T and excess noise ε C . Receiving the state, Bob randomly chooses one * Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: hongguo@ pku.edu.cn, Phone: +86-10-6275-7035, Fax: +86-10-6275-3208. quadrature to measure and informs Alice which observable he measured. Then, Alice and Bob should share two correlated Gaussian variables, from which they can extract a private binary key with standard reconciliation and privacy amplification process. However, in a realistic case, the optical source and modulators are imperfect and inevitably induces extra excess noise (denoted by two Gaussian random numbers ∆Q A and ∆P A ) to the coherent state. As a result, Alice actually prepares a state of |(Q A + ∆Q A ) + i(P A + ∆P A ) , where ∆Q A and ∆P A , independent with Q A and P A , have mean values 0 and variances ε 0 [13] . In a trusted-source model, neither Eve nor Alice can control this excess noise. So, it is convenient to phenomenologically assume that the noise of coherent state is not induced by the imperfection of devices but by a neutral party, Fred, who generates two random numbers, ∆Q A and ∆P A , and then introduces corresponding extra noise to the coherent state after an ideal modulation (See Fig. 1 ). In this case, the state sent to Bob is denoted by quadratures (Q,P), which satisfy
where δQ A and δP A are originated from shot noise, and satisfy δQ 
For the convenience of theoretical analysis, here we propose an entanglement based (E-B) scheme and will show it is equivalent to the P&M scheme. As shown in Fig. 2 , Fred prepares a pair of EPR beams ρ AB , and holds its purification. The global pure state shared by Alice, Bob and Fred is denoted by |ψ ABF , and ρ AB is assumed to be a Gaussian state. Quadratures (Q, P) denote the state sent to Bob, and (Q ′ , P ′ ) denote the state kept by Alice. Here, we assume (Q, P) and (Q ′ , P ′ ) satisfy
where V = V A + 1. According to [15] , we obtain
We assume that
which absolutely satisfies Eq. (4). Similarly, we assume that
In E-B scheme, Alice makes a balanced heterodyne detection on Q ′ and P ′ simultaneously. Denoting the values of Q ′ and
where δQ
Alice's best estimate of (Q, P) is denoted by (Q A , P A ), which satisfy [15] 
We can easily get
which shows the same result as in P&M scheme. 
where K D and K R correspond to the direct and reverse reconciliation, respectively. I(a : b) is the Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob. χ(a : 
where χ(a : EF) and χ(b : EF) are the Holevo bounds between Alice and the eavesdroppers. It can be proved that [19] χ(a : EF) − χ(a : E) ≥ 0.
Since ρ ABEF is a pure state, it has been proved thatK D and K R get their minimal values when ρ AB is a Gaussian state [14] . The Shannon mutual information is given by I(a : b) = 1/2 log 2 (V b V b|a ), where V b is the variance of the random variable of Bob, and V b|a is the conditional variance of the random variable of Bob while knowing Alice's measurement. Here, we can only calculate the case of Q quadrature for the symmetry in Q and P. Let Q B ′ be the result of Bob's measurement on the Q quadrature and Q A be Alice's best estimate of Q B ′ . We obtain
where χ = (1 − T )/T + ε 0 + ε c , and ε c denotes the excess noise in the channel. Hence
Since ρ ABEF is pure, we have S (ρ EF )=S (ρ AB ). So,
For a two-mode Gaussian state ρ AB , we can calculate its von Neumann entropy with its covariance matrix γ AB [20] , which can be expressed as
where A, B and C are 2 × 2 blocks. Let ∆(γ AB ) = det A + det B + 2 det C, and
Then the von Neumann entropy of ρ AB is [20] 
where
In the case where Alice prepares coherent states and Bob makes homodyne detection, it is easy to see that the covariance matrix of ρ AB is
When Alice makes her measurement, she splits her mode into two beams by a 50:50 beam splitter, and measures the Q and P quadratures of two beams respectively. If Bob chooses a quadrature to measure, say, the Q quadrature, then Alice discards the result of the measurement on the P quadrature. It is easy to see that the two mode state ρ a AB is still a Gaussian state. The covariance matrix of this state is
and
It can be found that the von Neumann conditional entropy S (ρ a AB ) does not depend on Alice's measurement a. So the Holevo bound is simply equal to
At the high modulation limit (V ≫ 1/(1 − T ), 1/T ), the lower bound of the secure key rate for the direct reconciliation is
Similarly, we can deriveK hom R in the high modulation limit,
The limiting value of ε 0 is shown as We will give a demonstration on how much the security bound is lower than the key rate derived in [13] . For comparing with the result in [13] , we just consider the effect of the noisy coherent states, and any excess noise in the channel is now assumed to be negligible. When the channel is noiseless, the key rate derived in [13] is
and in the high modulation limit it becomes
There is no limiting value of ε 0 in this case. If ε 0 = 0,K Fig. 3 . The exact secure key rate is just between the solid line and the dash line. So we can estimate how much information is lost when we use the lower bound. However, if the noise of the source is too large, the security bound will be too low and the gap between the solid line and dash line will be too large. In this case, it is hard to estimate how much information we lose. This problem can be solved if we can effectively purify the coherent state and reduce the excess noise [13] .
In conclusion, we study the security of a continuousvariable quantum key distribution protocol with noisy coherent states sent through a lossy and noisy channel. Though the protocol discussed is a P&M scheme, it is proved to be equivalent to an E-B scheme when we assume the noise in coherent states is induced by Fred, a neutral party, who does not give Eve any information. Though the state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve is not a pure state, and the secure key rate can not be calculated directly, we can derive the maximal mutual information between Eve and Alice/ Bob, if she is able to acquire extra information from Fred. So, we actually derive a lower bound to the secure key rate. We also give a demonstration that when the channel is lossy but noiseless, the lower bound becomes lower than the key rate derived in [13] with the increase of the excess noise in the coherent states. We can also purify the noisy coherent states to get a better estimation on the information lost.
